Railroad Retirement Act by Freese, John E.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 9 
Number 1 Volume 9, December 1934, Number 1 Article 10 
June 2014 
Railroad Retirement Act 
John E. Freese 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Freese, John E. (1934) "Railroad Retirement Act," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 9 : No. 1 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol9/iss1/10 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
That being so, the defendant is discharged, both legally and theo-
retically, of liability for there has been a variation of his risk with-
out his assent and without reservation of a right of recourse against
him.
WILLIAM E. SEWARD.
RAILROAD RETIREMENT AcT.
On June 30, 1934, there was presented to the President of the
United States for his signature a bill which may be the forerunner
of a host of similar legislative enactments affecting the social and
economic condition of the nation. President Roosevelt signified his
approval by signing the bill, thereby creating an Act "to provide a
retirement system for railroad employees, to provide unemployment
relief, and for other purposes". Thus the Railroad Retirement Act,
which the Seventy-third Congress had passed by a narrow margin
and which had encountered tremendous opposition from the carrier
systems of the country as well as various other moneyed interests,
became law.
The purposes of the Act are, according to its own language,
manifold. It is for the purpose of: (1) providing adequately for
the satisfactory retirement of aged employees; (2) promoting effi-
ciency and safety in interstate transportation; (3) making possible
(a) greater employment opportunity, (b) more rapid advancement
of employees in the service of carriers.
Under this Act every employee, including executives, is required
to pay into the Retirement Fund a percentage of his compensation,
except that all compensation exceeding $300 per month is excluded.
The carrier is required to pay a contribution equal to twice that of
its employees. The percentage of compensation to be thus paid is
to be determined by the Railroad Retirement Board, but until other-
wise determined, is declared to be 2 per cent for the employees. The
carrier is directed to deduct its employees' contribution from their
compensation and to pay the deducted amounts along with its own
contribution into the Treasury of the United States, which will hold
it in a special Retirement Fund.1
Retirement is compulsory under the Act upon all employees at-
taining the age of 65, except that such compulsory retirement does
not "apply to an employee who from and after the effective date
(August 1, 1934) occupies an official position". The carrier and the
employee may, by written agreement filed with the Railroad Retire-
1 Payments into the Treasury of the United States of the amount deducted
and of the carriers' own contribution are directed to be made quarterly, or
otherwise as the Board may order.
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ment Board, extend the time for retirement for successive periods of
one year each, but not beyond 70 years of age.
Such is a brief abstract of the Railroad Retirement Act,2 The
conception, birth and subsequent life of this Pension Law has been
attended by conflicting opinions; vigorous arguments have been ad-
vanced in favor of and against the legality and rationality of the Act.
However, all theories tend to agree on one point-this bit of legisla-
tion is of the greatest importance in determining the trend of future
legislative enactments.
On August 1, 1934, the Railroad Retirement Board created by
the Act came into being and the new Pension Law became effective. 3
From that date, events followed in swift succession. The Board is-
sued the statement that the first group of pensions would be granted
on February 1, 1935. The railroad interests countered by announcing,
through the American Railway Association, their intention of oppos-
ing the enforcement of the Act by appropriate court action.4 They
declared that their campaign would be fought on the grounds that
the new law discriminated against Class I carriers. At the same time
the various railroads themselves differed on the immediate action to
be taken. Some announced that deductions would be made from their
employees' salaries immediately, while others determined to defer any
action until the controversy had been threshed out in open court and
a decision reached.
For a week affairs remained in statu quo. On August 13, one
hundred and thirty-seven railroads, through counsel for the Associa-
tion of Railway Executives, filed suit against the Railroad Retire-
ment Board and its individual members in the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia to enjoin the said Board from enforcing the
Act.5 Petitioners alleged among other things that the first year's
cost to them will approximate $60,000,000, becoming even more bur-
densome in subsequent years. They attacked the constitutionality of
the Act on four grounds, namely: (1) Congress has transgressed
its powers because the Act has no relation to the promotion of effi-
ciency and safety of interstate transportation; (2) the provisions
of said Act are unreasonable and arbitrary; (3) said Act applies to
all employees, including those not engaged in any commerce, those
engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, and those not engaged
in interstate commerce, or work so closely related thereto as to war-
rant regulation to promote efficiency or safety of interstate trans-
portation and also to certain persons not employees; (4) the Act
is not a valid exercise of the power granted to Congress by the
''commerce" clause for the reason that the Act is designed to provide
for the satisfactory retirement of veteran employees and to create
2 
RAILROAD RFTIREMENT AcT, Public, No. 385, 73d Cong. [§3231].
'N. Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1934, at 25:6.
'N. Y. Times, Aug. 2, 4, 11, 12, 1934.
N. Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1934, at 1:7.
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greater employment opportunities, in spite of the express declaration
that one of its aims is the promotion of efficiency and safety in inter-
state transportation.6
Petitioners alleged further that the Act discloses on its face that
it is experimentation at the expense of petitioners; furthermore, it
authorizes the Board to require of petitioners contribution for ad-
ministration and research, and without limiting the amount,7 all in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. This final (oft and much relied
on) allegation assails the validity of the Act on the ground that, in
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, the railroad
interests are deprived of property and liberty of contract without
due process of law, and property is taken without just compensation.
On August 16 the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
denied the application of the combined railroad group for a tempo-
rary injunction on the grounds that since the Board asks only enough
funds to permit the commencement of administrative work, the rail-
roads are not in danger of great damage. In an opinion written by
Judge Proctor, the court said: 8
"In the light of the consideration on each side and the
stated plans of the Board, which do not threaten any great
and immediate danger to the railroads, there is no proper
showing for issuance of a restraining order. I, of course, can
conceive of a situation arising which may justify the railroads
in coming in with a renewal of their application at any time.
I see nothing now to suggest the presence of any immediate
or great damage. The petition will be refused without preju-
dice."
The following day the Board issued two orders. 9 The first re-
quired Class I carriers to contribute one-tenth of one per cent of
their July payrolls, no road to pay more than $5,000; these contribu-
tions amounted to about $125,000, which was to be used for admin-
istrative expenses. The second order required each railroad to sub-
mit a list of the names of all employees reaching the age of seventy
by February 1, 1935.
The railroad group immediately marshalled their forces in re-
newed attempts to have the new Act declared unconstitutional. Their
efforts culminated successfully when, on October 24, the Supreme
'The petition alleged that many employees, such as the clerical forces of
the railroads, attorneys and doctors, as well as heads of railroad labor unions
and employees of the Railroad Retirement Board itself-none of whom could
be said to be engaged in interstate commerce-are affected by the Act. This,
it is claimed, places an unwarranted burden on the railroads.
'The Board is empowered, if necessity, demands, to increase the percentage
fixed in the Act, without altering the ratio between carrier and employee
contributions.
IN. Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1934, at 27:2.
'N. Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1934, at 2:5; Aug. 25, 1934, at 17:7.
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Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as an equity court1 0 in
testing the Railroad Retirement Act, found it to be unconstitutional."
The decision in effect is a warning to Congress not to overreach
its powers under the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution.
In the instant case, the lower court (perhaps with past National In-
dustrial Recovery Acts brewing in the back of the judicial mind and
future pension and unemployment insurance bills staring into the
judicial face) has decreed that the breaking point was reached by
the legislature when it hurried this bill through its last session.
Substantially the same arguments were offered in the case be-
fore Chief Justice Wheat as those in the prior proceedings before
Judge Proctor. The railroad group added the further somewhat
fallacious argument that their own pension systems adequately care
for aged or incapacitated employees in a manner which engenders
loyalty and faithful cooperation on the part of the employees, thereby
raising the standard of efficiency and service rendered to the public.
The enforcement of the new law will, so the carriers aver, change
this voluntarily sponsored pension system into a compulsory one,
thereby effectively killing any feelings of gratitude and loyalty on the
part of the employees toward the railroads.
The court answers this objection briefly by saying: 12
"These matters, however, seem to me to involve ques-
tions of wisdom and propriety rather than of power, and to
be for the consideration of the Congress rather than the
courts."
As regards the further objections, Chief Justice Wheat predi-
cated his decision on the theory that the Act was too extensive and
widespread both in regard to the railroads and the employees em-
braced thereby. In the words of the learned justice: 13
"When the act is examined in detail I find it contains
provisions which, in my opinion, were beyond the power of
Congress and which render it unconstitutional.
10 The case, unreported as yet, is entitled The Alton Railroad Company and
others v. The Railroad Retirement Board and Murray Latimer, John William-
son and Lee Eddy, individually and as members of the Railroad Retirement
Board.
IN. Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1934. (By agreement the hearing before Chief
Justice Alfred A. Wheat was treated as a final hearing on its merits, both
sides submitting evidence in the form of affidavits. An appeal from the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to the Court of Appeals and
proceedings therein would tend to delay unduly the final determination as to
the constitutionality of the Act. Therefore under Section 347 of Title 28 of
the United States Code, the United States Supreme Court may accept juris-
diction after the case has reached the Court of Appeals, prior to a decision in
such court.2
'Supra note 11.
2Ibid.
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"In the first place, the act is unconstitutional, because it
extends its provisions to persons not engaged in interstate
commerce.
"The retirement act confers its benefits upon all employees
of any company to which it relates without regard to distinc-
tion between interstate commerce, intrastate commerce, or ac-
tivities which do not constitute commerce at all."
Chief Justice Wheat cites from the record before him that "some
200,000, approximately one-fifth of all the employees of the plaintiffs,
do not work in interstate commerce or in work so closely connected
therewith as to be a part thereof".
The facts of the record bear out the contention of the railroads
that the Act is quite extensive; for instance, the Long Island Rail-
road, whose lines are solely within the state of New York, have a
large number of employees engaged only in intrastate commerce.
The New York Central and the Illinois Central Railroads are some-
what similarly situated, since much of their property and many
of their employees, though engaged purely in intrastate commerce,
are affected by the Retirement Act.
The learned justice has struck what seem to be several telling
blows at the faulty and admittedly hurried construction of the Act,
in spite of the fact that he appears at times to be trying to save his
face in the event of a reversal by the appellate tribunal. He invokes
the doctrine of stare decisis by reiterating a statement of the Presi-
dent of the United States, that "Decision of this bill has been diffi-
cult". He retains his position beside (or behind) the Chief Executive
by admitting that the bill, although much improved in its final form,
is still crudely drawn and will require many changes and amendments
at the next session of Congress.
From time immemorial debate has raged over the extent of the
powers accorded to Congress by the United States Constitution. With
the advent of varied modes of transportation and communication, the
spotlight has focused on that magic phrase-the interstate commerce
clause. Just what is its significance?
The controversy over a statute of this type resolves itself into
two questions. 1. May Congress, in the exercise of its powers over
interstate commerce, regulate the relations of common carriers and
their employees while both are engaged in such commerce? 2. Has
Congress exceeded its power in that regard by prescribing the regula-
tions which are embodied in the act in question? Obviously in the
light of reams upon reams of well-considered opinions the answer to
the first question is in the affirmative.
It has been broadly held that the power of Congress to regu-
late commerce extends to all the means, appliances, facilities and in-
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strumentalities of commerce.14 Linn Sing v. Washburn 15 and other
leading cases 16 are authority for the principle that such power ex-
tends to persons as well as property.
As to the second query, decision is not so easily rendered and is
dependent upon a close reading of the statute itself.
The October, 1907, term of the United States Supreme Court
had before it the problem of the Employers' Liability Act.17 There
too the constitutionality of an act passed by Congress under the in-
terstate commerce clause was in issue. The nine learned jurists con-
templated the act in dispute from such divers viewpoints that the
decision rendered was agreed to by only five of the nine. The opin-
ion of the court was written by Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Day
concurring with him; Mr. Justice Peckham delivered a separate opin-
ion, with which the chief justice and Mr. Justice Brewer concurred.
Then followed three additional dissenting opinions by Mr. Justice
Moody, Mr. Justice Holmes, and Mr. Justice Harlan, with the latter
of whom Mr. Justice McKenna agreed. From the above, it is not
to be gainsaid that the question of the extent and scope of the powers
of Congress over interstate commerce is not only important and in-
teresting, but also highly debatable.
In the Employers' Liability cases,' 8 defences were raised similar
to those in the case at hand-in brief, to what extent may Congress
control by legislation the various phases of interstate commerce? In
the prevailing opinion, Mr. Justice White remarks: 9
"The act then being addressed to all common carriers en-
gaged in interstate commerce, and imposing a liability upon
them in favor of any of their employees, without qualification
or restriction as to the business in which the carriers or their
employes may be engaged at the time of the injury, of neces-
sity includes subjects wholly outside of the power of Congress
to regulate commerce. Without stopping to consider the nu-
merous instances where although a common carrier is engaged
in interstate commerce such carrier may in the nature of things
also transact business not interstate commerce, although such
"Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347 (1875); Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 24 Sup. Ct. 436 (1903) ; Stock-
ton v. Baltimore & N. Y. Railway Co., 32 Fed. 9 (C. C. N. J. 1887).
n 20 Cal. 543.
""Head Money Cases," 18 Fed. 135 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1883) ; Memphis
& Little Rock Ry. Co. v. Nolan, 14 Fed. 532 (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1882).
'7207 U. S. 463, 28 Sup. Ct. 141, 52 L. ed. 297 (1907), aff'g, 148 Fed. 986
(C. C. W. D. Ky. 1906) and 148 Fed. 997 (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1906).
"Ibid.
"Ibid. These contentions are thus summed up in the brief filed on behalf
of the Government: "It is the carrier and not its employees that the act seeks
to regulate, and the carrier is subject to such regulation because it is engaged
in interstate commerce. * * * By engaging in interstate commerce the carrier
chooses to subject itself and its business to the control of Congress, and cannot
be heard to complain of such regulations."
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
local business may indirectly be related to interstate commerce.
***. As the act thus includes many subjects wholly beyond
the power to regulate commerce and depends for its sanction
upon that authority, it results that the act is repugnant to the
Constitution, and cannot be enforced unless there is merit in
the propositions advanced to show that the statute may be
saved. * * * It is yet insisted that the act is within the power
of Congress, because one who engages in interstate commerce
thereby comes under the power of Congress as to all his busi-
ness and may not complain of any regulation which Congress
may choose to adopt."
The court disposed of this argument quite readily by denying
the assumption that "because one engages in interstate commerce he
thereby endows Congress with power not delegated to it by the Con-
stitution". Naturally such a presumption would be contrary to the
spirit and letter of the Constitution, and if upheld, would extend the
power of Congress so as to include power of legislation over matters,
now and from the beginning of the Union, under the control of the
states.
In his brief the attorney general pointed out that a statute should
not be construed so as to render it unconstitutional when a constitu-
tional construction is open to the court. In his prevailing opinion
Mr. Justice White remarked that although it is incumbent on the court
to so construe an Act of Congress as to render it valid, if lawfully
possible, an ambiguous statute will not be rewritten by the court to
obtain this result, the writer goes on to say: 20
"Concluding, as we do, that the statute, whilst it em-
braces subjects within the authority of Congress to regulate
commerce, also includes subjects not within its constitutional
power, and that the two are so interblended in the statute that
they are incapable of separation, we are of the opinion that
the courts below rightly held the statute to be repugnant to
the Constitution and nonenforceable."
The Act was held invalid.
Four years later, the 1911 term of the United States Supreme
Court decided the Second Employers' Liability cases. 2 1 The Second
Employers' Liability Act, unlike the first Act, dealt merely with the
liability of a railroad engaged in interstate commerce for injuries
sustained by its employees while engaged in interstate commerce.
The Court, Mr. Justice Van DeVanter writing the opinion, held the
Second Employers' Liability Act constitutional. 22
' Supra note 17.
=223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169, 56 L. ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. (N. s.) 44 (1911).
SIt may be noted that Mr. Justice Van Devanter did not grace the
Supreme Court bench at the time that the First Employers' Liability Cases
were decided; he became an associate justice in 1910.
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The decision was based on the ground that the effect upon in-
terstate commerce, rather than the source of the dispute, was the
important test of validity.2 3 The Court distinguished the two cases
by pointing out that 24
"* * * the present Act 25 unlike the one condemned in Employ-
ers' Liability cases, 26 deals only with the liability of a carrier
engaged in interstate commerce for injuries sustained by its
employees while engaged in such commerce. And this being
so, it is not a valid objection that the act embraces instances
where the causal negligence is that of an employee engaged in
intrastate commerce; for such negligence, when operating in-
juriously upon an employee engaged in interstate commerce,
has the same effect upon that commerce as if the negligent
employee were also engaged therein".
Mr. Justice Van Devanter cited the opinion written by himself
in Southern Railway Co. v. United States,27 wherein he said:
"The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce
is plenary and competently may be exerted to secure the safety
of the persons and property transported therein and of those
who are employed in such transportation, no matter what may
be the source of the dangers which threaten it. That is to
say, it is no objection to such an exertion of this power that
the dangers intended to be avoided arise, in whole or in part,
out of matters connected with intrastate commerce." (Italics
ours.)
The rule laid down in these cases was restated and confirmed in
the celebrated "Shreveport" cases.28 Therein the Supreme Court de-
clared that the power granted to Congress by the Constitution should
extend at all times to cope with varying exigencies that may occur in
order to keep interstate commerce free from local control. The court
pointed out that 29
2' Here it was the negligence of an intrastate worker resulting in injury to
an interstate employee.
2 Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, at p. 51.
' SECOND EpLoaYERS' LIABILITY ACT.
"1207 U. S. 463, 28 Sup Ct. 141 (1907).
" 2 22 U. S. 20, 32 Sup. Ct. 2 (1911), where the question was presented
whether the amendment to the Safety Appliance Act (March 2, 1903, c. 976,
32 STAT. 943) was within the power of Congress in view of the fact that the
statute was not confined to vehicles that were used in interstate traffic but also
embraced those used in intrastate traffic.
. Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States, Texas and
Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. 833 (1913).
In the opinion of the Court, in Houston & Texas Railway Co. v. United
States, mipra note 28: "It is unnecessary to repeat what has frequently been
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"The fact that carriers are instruments of intrastate commerce,
as well as of interstate commerce, does not derogate from the
complete and paramount authority of Congress over the lat-
ter or preclude the Federal power from being exerted to pre-
vent the intrastate operations of such carriers from being made
a means of injury to that which has been confided to Federal
care. Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of
carriers are so related that the government of the one involves
the control of the other, it is Congress, and not the State, that
is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule, for other-
wise Congress would be denied the exercise of its constitu-
tional authority and the state, and not the nation, would be
supreme within the national field".
In substance, the Court believed that, although Congress may not
have power to regulate the internal commerce of a state, per se, never-
theless, pursuant to its authority to control interstate commerce, it
may so affect intrastate commerce if the latter is closely interwoven
with the former.
Section 1 of the Railroad Retirement Act contains a provision
harshly inequitable in its possible effect. Judge Wheat pointed this
out when it was shown that about 143,000 men, who had left the
employ of the carrier systems during the year prior to the date of
the enactment of the Act (some of whom had been dismissed for
cause), would be entitled to the benefits of pension.30 Furthermore,
upon the re-employment of any person formerly in the service of a
carrier, such former service may be counted as part of his total ser-
vice in computing his annuity. According to this, there are today
over a million persons entitled to such benefit.
A statute is prospective and not retroactive, unless "it is intended
to remedy a mischief, to promote justice, to correct innocent mis-
takes, to cure irregularities in judicial proceedings or to give effect
to acts and contracts of individuals according to the intention
thereof".81
said by this court with respect to the complete and paramount character of
the power confided to Congress to regulate commerce among the several States.
It is of the essence of this power that, where it exists, it dominates. Interstate
trade was not left to be destroyed or impeded by the rivalries of local govern-
ments. The purpose was to make impossible the recurrence of the evils which
had overwhelmed the Confederation and to provide the necessary basis of
national unity by insuring 'uniformity of regulation against conflicting and
discriminating state legislation.'"
' The opinion states: "The right to annuities is not dependent upon the
rendition of service subsequent to enactment and the computation of the
annuities is not confined to service rendered subsequent, but includes service
rendered prior thereto." Supra note 11.
' Winfree v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 173 Fed. 65, af'd, 227 U. S.
296, 33 Sup. Ct. 273, 57 L. ed. 518 (1912).
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By the Railroad Retirement Act, an employee may assert pension
rights on a contract of employment which was made, -performed, and
terminated before the Act was passed. This prior term of employ-
ment may be added to existing or future terms in computing what
pension the applicant shall receive. Certainly the Act cannot be in-
terpreted under any of the classifications above-mentioned. Yet is
it obviously retroactive-altering contracts of employment which
were made and executed prior to passage of the law by Congress.
In 1814 the case of Society for Propagation of the Gospel v.
Wheeler 32 decided that a statute creating a new obligation, imposing
a new duty, or attaching a new disability in respect to past transac-
tions, is illegally retroactive, and thus contrary to the sacred doctrine
of the inviolability of contracts. Cases are legion wherein this prin-
ciple was heralded as elementary in determining the validity of dis-
puted statutory enactments.33
Were such power conceded to vest in Congressto alter and amend
contracts by subsequent legislation, the parties to contracts would be
in ridiculously precarious positions; contract law would become a
farce.
That portion of the Pension Act which vests additional rights
in the employee in prior terms of employment would seem to be di-
rectly violative of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and, to
all existing principles of contract law.
When the Railroad Retirement Act comes before the United
States Supreme Court, several nice questions will arise. Will the
Supreme Court sitting in 1934 use the decision of the same Court,
invalidating the First Employers' Liability Act, as a precedent and
declare this Act unconstitutional? Or will it take the view that the
"New Deal" era fathered by the present administration demands a
liberal interpretation of the iron-bound Constitution, and rely on the
Second Employers' Liability cases and the "Shreveport" decision?
Will the Court take judicial notice of the peculiar economic crisis
through which the world is passing and decree that this piece of social
legislation shall stand as one of the first mile-posts along the road to
economic betterment of labor?
The Attorney General of the United States recognizes the im-
portance of this cornerstone of future Congressional enactments, in
declaring:
"It is important that the Supreme Court pass on this act
as soon as possible, not only for the particular purpose of pass-
Fed. Cas. No. 13,156 (2 Gall. 105).
Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U. S. 380, 7 L. ed. 458 (1829); Albee v.
May, Fed. Cas. No. 134 (2 Paine, C. C. 74) (1834); Wilder v. Lumpkin, 4
Ga. 208 (1848) ; State v. Squires, 26 Iowa 340 (1858) ; Thornton v. McGrath,
62 Ky. 349 (1864); Wilson v. Hardesty, 1 Md. Ch. 66 (1847); Baugher v.
Nelson, 9 Gill 299, 52 Am. Dec. 694 (1850); Reed v. Beall, 42 Miss. 472(1869); Bleakney v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank, 17 Serg. & R. 64 (1827);
Burch v. Nevbury, 10 N. Y. (6 Seld.) 374 (1852).
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ing on the Railway Retirement Act, but also to determine the
scope to which any such acts can go." 34
On the same day that the Railroad Retirement Act was held
invalid, the President's Commission on Economic Security voted to
recommend old-age pension and unemployment insurance legislation,
as well as sickness insurance. This shows the general tendency today
toward social insurance legislation which will aid labor in its fight
to safeguard the workman from unwelcome charity in the event of
sickness, unemployment and old age. Will the Supreme Court, in
considering its decision on the Act under discussion, take cognizance
of the fact that a balk of the attempt of Congress to provide for rail-
road employees may deter and hinder future legislative efforts along
the same lines? Or will the Supreme Court take the view that a
denial of the constitutionality of the Railroad Retirement Act will
be in the nature of a warning to Congress and other lesser legisla-
tures to draw bills more carefully?
Social legislation, such as the Railroad Retirement Act exempli-
fies, has been sponsored by labor ever since it became a recognized
force in industry. Even if this present Act is denied life by the court,
it is inevitable that further proposals along the same lines in other
industries will be made. That such legislation will be a burden to
the various industries cannot be denied. Nevertheless such legis-
lation is a necessary adjunct to the betterment of industrial, social
and economic existence and, as such, is bound to eventuate. Such
laws require, in addition to painstaking study of industrial condi-
tions, careful drawing on the part of the legislators in order to con-
form with constitutional requirements. Spokesmen for the railroads
and the employees alike agree that the Pension Act is, per se, funda-
mentally progressive, but likewise concur in the opinion that it is
poorly drawn and open to adverse criticism.35
In drawing a conclusion as to the fate of the Railroad Retire-
ment Act in its appearance before the august tribunal in Washington,
the last section of the Act must be given due consideration, for per-
haps thereon depends the decision. This is the separability clause
which states that if any portion of the Act shall be declared invalid,
the remainder shall not be affected thereby.36
'United States Law Week, Vol. 2, No. 9, Index 156.
' It has been pointed out that certain railroads have cut down their
employment lists since the Pension Act went into effect. Heads of various
railroads defend this as a natural let-down in business, and assert that it is
not a by-product of the new law. Expressing an opinion felt by most execu-
tives, Daniel Willard, President of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, in a state-
ment to the press, said: "The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad is not opposed to
pensions. We pay the entire cost of pensioning employees of more than fifty
years. We are opposed to certain features of the Pension Law rather hurriedly
passed by the last Congress and we hope that the next Congress may correct
the features that clearly seem wrong." (N. Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1934, at 17:7.)
'RAILROAD RETIREMENT Acr, Public, No. 385, 73d Cong. [§3231] §14:
"If any provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or
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While it may be granted that the Act does not violate the inter-
state commerce clause or the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution,
its retroactive feature does seem to attempt to alter and amend exe-
cuted contracts. Will the Supreme Court deem it advisable to take
advantage of the separability clause and its prerogative of "separating
the chaff from the wheat", thus cutting out the retroactive portion
while preserving the valid sections of the Act?
While the highest court in the land enjoys a reputation of rare
conservatism, it has been known in the past to perform astonishing
feats of judicial reasoning in order to sustain legislation which has
met with the Court's approval.
In the light of the known status of Mr. Justice Van Devanter
and Chief Justice Hughes, who, it must always be remembered, wrote
the opinions in the Second Employers' Liability cases and the
"Shreveport" case, the liberal bloc of Benjamin Cardozo, Louis
Brandeis, Harlan F. Stone and Owen J. Roberts should be able to
influence the Supreme Court in holding the Railroad Retirement Act
valid, if not in full, at least in part.
JOHN E. FREESE.
POWER OF TRUSTEES TO LEASE-INSTRUCTIONS.
A TRUSTEE, AFTER SECURING THE APPROVAL OF A LONG TERM
LEASE BY THE SUPREME COURT UNDER SECTIONS 106 AND 107 OF THE
REAL PROPERTY LA W, 1 HAS NO AUTHORITY TO MODIFY THE TERMS
OF SAID LEASE, WITHOUT A LIKE APPROVAL BY THE COURT. 2
THE COURTS WILL NOT DECIDE QUESTIONS OF BUSINESS JUDG-
MENT, BUT WILL LEAVE THEM TO THE TRUSTEE.
1. Power to lease for term of trust estate.
It has never been doubted that a trustee who is charged with
the receipt and disposal of the income of real property necessarily
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act or application of such
provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby."
" N. Y. REAL PRop. LAW §106. A trustee appointed to hold real property
during the life of a beneficiary, and to pay or apply the rents, income and
profits thereof to, or for, the use of such beneficiary, may execute and deliver
a lease of such real property for a term not exceeding five years, without appli-
cation to the court. The Supreme Court may, by order, on such terms and
conditions as seem just and proper, in respect to rentals and renewals, authorize
such a trustee to lease such real property for a term exceeding five years, if it
appears to the satisfaction of the court that it is for the best interest of the
trust estate.
§107. Provides for notice to beneficiary and other persons interested
where real property affected by a trust is conveyed, mortgaged or leased, and
procedure thereon.
'City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Smith, 263 N. Y. 292, 189 N. E. 222
(1934), aff'd on reargument, 264 N. Y. 396, 191 N. E. 720 (1934).
